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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the lower court properly dismissed appellant's 
Complaint against defendant Gibbons and Reed Company ("Gibbons and 
Reed"), incorrectly styled "Gibbons & Reed Construction Company," 
on the ground and for the reason that appellant's sole and exclusive 
remedy against her deceased husband's employer, Gibbons and Reed, 
is under the provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 35-1-60 of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act 
is determinative of this action. It provides: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sus-
tained by an employee, whether resulting in 
death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer and shall be the exclusive 
remedy against any officer, agent or employee 
of the employer, and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this Act shall be in place 
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, 
at common law or otherwise, to such employee, 
widow, children, parents, dependants, next-of-
kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, 
or any other person whomsoever, on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred 
by such employee in the course of or because 
of or arising out of his employment, and no 
action at law may be maintained against an 
employer or any other officer, agent or employee 
of the employer based upon any accident, injury 
or death of an employee. Nothing in this sec-
tion, however, shall prevent an employee (or 
his dependents) from filing a claim with the 
- 2 -
Industrial Commission of Utah for compensa-
tion in those cases within the provisions of 
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, 
as amended. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-60 (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gibbons and Reed accepts, for the purpose of this appeal, 
appellant's Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts. However, 
Gibbons and Reed propounds the following additional uncontroverted 
facts: 
1. At the time of his death, appellant's deceased hus-
band, Lewis Junior Stewart, was employed by Gibbons and Reed. R. 18. 
2. At the time of his death, Mr. Stewart was acting 
within the scope and course of his employment. R. 18. 
3. On August 29, 1983, the date of Mr. Stewart's death, 
Gibbons and Reed had in force and legal effect Workmen's Compensa-
tion Insurance as required by the State of Utah. R. 18. 
4. All Workmen's Compenation benefits payable by reason 
of Mr. Stewart's death were paid to his heirs. R. 19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Gibbons and Reed contends the lower court properly ruled, 
based upon the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and recent decisions 
— o — 
of this Court, that appellant1s sole and exclusive remedy for the 
death of her husband is pursuant to the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
Act. The Workmen's Compensation Act provides the sole and exclusive 
remedy against employers for injuries suffered by employees during 
the course and scope of their employment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION ACT PROVIDE PLAINTIFF'S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY AGAINST GIBBONS AND REED FOR THE DEATH 
OF HER HUSBAND. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act, enacted in Utah in 1917, 
is intended to benefit employees and their dependents by providing 
a measure of economic security without exposing them to the risks 
and uncertainties involved in proving fault by pursuing lawsuits 
against their employers for employment-related injuries. Barber 
Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 
266 (1943); United Airlines Transport Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591 (1944); Wilstead v. Industrial 
Commission, 17 Utah 2d 214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965). The Workmen's 
Compensation Act also protects employers complying with the Act 
from vexatious lawsuits. Bryan v. Utah International, 533 P. 2d 
892 (Utah 1975). For over 75 years, this Court has defended these 
objectives of the Workmen1s Compensation Act by repelling numerous 
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attacks on the exclusivity of remedy provisions found in Section 
35-1-60. In fact, the most recent decision of this Court addressing 
the issue, Morrill v. J. & M. Construction Company, Inc., 635 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1981), emphasizes the clear and unequivocal mandate of 
Section 35-1-60 and supports the trial court's dismissal of plain-
tiff's Complaint against Gibbons and Reed: 
A reading of Title 35-1-60 . . . makes 
it clear that the Act is the exclusive vehicle 
for recovery of compensation for injury or 
death, against the employer and other employees 
to the exclusion of "any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or other-
wise . . . ." 
635 P.2d 89 (emphasis in original). 
Appellant acknowledged before the lower court that her 
deceased husband, Lewis Junior Stewart, was an employee of Gibbons 
and Reed and was acting in the course and scope of his employment 
at the time of his death. Notwithstanding the language of Section 
35-1-60, appellant argues, however, that because her claim against 
Gibbons and Reed is grounded in strict products liability, Section 
35-1-60 should not be applied to bar her civil action.1 Appellant 
1
 Although not part of this appeal, it is doubtful that appel-
lant's Complaint states a legally sufficient products liability 
claim against Gibbons and Reed. Appellant fails to allege that 
Gibbons and Reed was in the business of selling machines such as 
the one that plaintiff's husband was working on when he was killed 
or that Gibbons and Reed did, in fact, sell the machine. 5ej~f 
for example, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; 
Harm v. Armco Steel Corp., 601 P.2d 155 (Utah 1979). 
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contends, that this Court should adopt the "dual capacity'1 doctrine 
which provides that employers who undertake functions other than 
those of employer, are subject to all of the civil liabilities 
and duties arising from the additional functions. 
Appellant cites Bryan v. Utah International, supra, and 
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signall Drilling Company, 658 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1983), for the proposition that Section 35-1-60 is not an 
absolute bar to civil actions brought by injured employees against 
their employers and, therefore, this Court's adoption of the "dual 
capacity" doctrine would not be without precedent. Both decisions 
are distinguishable from the instant action. 
Bryan v. Utah International involved an action brought 
by an employee against his co-employee and employer for injuries 
intentionally inflicted by the co-employee. The lower court dismis-
sed the action against both the co-employee and employer on the 
ground that Workmen's Compensation benefits were the injured employ-
ee's sole remedy. On appeal, this Court reversed the lower court's 
dismissal of the action against the co-employee, but affirmed as 
to the employer. In the instant action, appellant does not allege 
that Gibbons and Reed intentionally injured her husband. The Utah 
International decision is, therefore, inapplicable. 
The second decision, Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal 
Drilling Company, did not involve an action by an injured employee 
- 6 -
against his employer. Rather, the case involved a controversy 
between the employer and the defendant over the validity of an 
indemnity agreement. Neither of these decisions represent the 
substantial exception to Section 35-1-60 advocated by the plaintiff 
in this action. 
In response to plaintiff Ts argument that this Court should 
adopt the "dual capacity" doctrine, Gibbons and Reed submits that 
the overwhelming majority of decisions addressing the "dual capac-
ity" doctrine have rejected it. See, 2 A. Larsen, Workmen's Compen-
sation for Occupational Injuries and Death, Section 72.80-83 (Desk 
ed., J. Duke ed. 1984). (Addendum I). Indeed, all of the cases 
cited in Appellant's Brief arising in the State of California were 
legislatively overridden by a 1982 Amendment to the California 
Labor Code, Cal. Lab. Code Section 3602(b)(3) (West 1985). (Adden-
dum II). The California Amendment distinguishes between equipment 
manufactured and sold by an employer which ultimately injures an 
employee and equipment manufactured solely for use in the employer's 
business. In the latter instance Workmen's Compensation benefits 
are the injured employee's sole remedy, while in the former in-
stance, the injured employee may maintain an independent civil 
action based upon a products liability theory. In addition, al-
though plaintiff has cited two cases from the State of Illinois 
purporting to support the dual capacity doctrine, the most recent 
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Illinois decision, Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machines, Inc., 82 111. 
App.3d 1054, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1980), held that when a machine, de-
signed and manufactured by an employer, is used to aid the employ-
e e s business, the construction of the machine is auxiliary to the 
business. Consequently, the employer's duty to its employee flows 
from the employment relationship and Workmen's Compensation benefits 
are an injured employee's sole remedy. 
Moreover, this Court has held on at least two occasions 
that the exclusive remedy provisions of Section 35-1-60 apply to 
allegations that an employer has furnished defective or dangerous 
equipment to an employee. In Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Company, 
29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973), this Court held that the claim 
by an employee that his employer knowingly furnished him with a dan-
gerous and defective machine did not state a cause of action suffi-
cient to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. Buhler v. Gossner, 530 P.2d 803 (Utah 1975). This 
Court held that once Section 35-1-60 is determined to be applicable, 
it is unnecessary and inadvisable for the Court to extend discussion 
to the alleged negligence and/or improper conduct of the employer. 
These decisions are buttressed by a decision by Judge David K. 
Winder, of the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, in the case of Holden v. N, L. Industries, Inc., No. C 79-0391 
slip op. (D. Utah 1982). (Addendum III). Judge Winder, applying 
- 8 -
Utah law, held that the Utah courts would not adopt the "dual capac-
ity" doctrine in a case wherein the decedent's employer allegedly 
designed and manufactured the equipment causing the decedent's 
death. Judge Winder stated that the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act bars an injured employee's claims 
against the defendant employer arising out of products liability. 
In summary, appellant's argument, if adopted, would 
subject employers to civil products liability actions for virtually 
every piece of equipment, tool or machine utilized and, at the same 
time, require them to maintain Workmen's Compensation coverage for 
other employment related injuries. Such a result is contrary to 
the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act and should not be 
sanctioned by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm Judge 
Rigtrup's decision and reaffirm that Workmen's Compensation benefits 
constitute the appellant's sole and exclusive remedy against Gibbons 
and Reed for the death of her husband. 
DATED this 30zJi day of August, 1985. 
LeROY iff AXLAND, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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14-65 WHO ABE 'THIRD PERSONS" § 72.81 
§ 72.80 The dual-persona doctrine 
§ 72.81 Meaning of "dual persona" 
An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort 
suit by an employee, if—and only if—he possesses a second 
persona so completely independent from and unrelated to his 
status as employer that by established standards the law recog-
nizes it as a separate legal person. 
In this formulation, an attempt has been made to correct the 
looseness and overextension attending the so-called "dual 
capacity" doctrine. In a sense, a single legal person may be said 
to have many "capacities," since that term has no fixed legal 
meaning. As a result, a few courts have stretched the doctrine 
so far as to destroy employer immunity whenever there was, 
not a separate legal person, but merely a separate relationship 
or theory of liability. When one considers how many such 
added relations an employer might have in the course of a 
day's work—as landowner, land occupier, products manufac-
turer, installer, modifier, vendor, bailor, repairman, vehicle 
owner, shipowner, doctor, hospital, health services provider, 
self-insurer, safety inspector—it is plain enough that this trend 
could go a long way toward demolishing the exclusive remedy 
principle. The relations just listed, by the way, are not hypo-
thetical; they will all be met in the following pages. In one of 
the best-known cases, Mercer v. UniroyaU Inc.,7 a truckdriver, 
injured because of a blowout, discovered that the tire had been 
manufactured by his employer. He brought an action based on 
products liability and recovered. To get some idea of what this 
might lead to, one has only to look at some of the extrapolations 
that have been attempted. Thus, in an Illinois case3 the em-
ployer had merely modified a machine, and the employee 
sued him in products liability as a "quasi-manufacturer." He 
did not succeed. Imagine how much would remain of employ-
7 49 Ohio App. 279, 361 N.E2d 492 (1977). 
• Rosales v. Verson Allsteei Press Co., 41 111. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 
(1976). 
•(ReUO-W83 ftib.347) 
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er immunity if it were forfeited every time an employer ad-
justed or tinkered with a machine. In a Michigan case,9 it 
happened that the glove which got caught in a drill press was 
sold to plaintiff by his employer. The plaintiff brought an ac-
tion—again unsuccessful—based on the vendor-vendee rela-
tionship. And in an even more far-fetched Illinois attempt, the 
employer, who had obtained a crane on lease, was sued as a 
"distributor of an unreasonably dangerous product."10 
Since the term "dual capacity" has proved to be subject to 
such misapplication and abuse, the only effective remedy is to 
jettison it altogether, and substitute the term "dual persona 
doctrine." The choice of the term "persona" is not the result 
of any predilection for elegant Latinisms for their own sake; it 
is dictated by the literal language of the typical third-party 
statute, which usually defines a third party, in the first in-
stance, as "a person other than the employer."10-1 This is quite 
different from "a person acting in a capacity other than that 
of employer." The question is not one of activity, or relation-
ship—it is one of identity. The Tennessee Supreme Court, 
brushing aside all the fictitious sophistry of "dual capacity," 
nailed down this point with breathtaking simplicity: 
"The employer is the employer; not some person other 
* Neal v. Roura Iron Works, 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975). 
i° Profilet v. Fallomte, 56 111. App. 3d 168,14 111. Dec. 16,371 N.E.2d 1069 
(1977). Judgment for defendant. 
io.i Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W 2d 912 (Ky App 1981). The ad-
ministrator of the decedent's estate appealed a summary judgment ruling m 
which it was found that the workmen's compensation remedy was exclusive. 
The administrator sought relief against the decedent's employer as the 
manufacturer of the coil of steel that caused the death under a products 
liability theory as well. The court affirmed the denial of benefits on, the 
products liability theory, and held that the dual capacity theory was improp-
erly invoked. The pertinent Kentucky statute retained the exclusivity of the 
workmen's compensation remedy, unleso, said the court, "[n]ew duties and 
obligations on the part of the emplover . give nse to another distinct legal 
persona who may be separately liable." 623 S W 2d 912. 
•(Rel 10-4/83 Pub 347) 
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than the employer. It is as simple as that.11 
The only way a court can break through this monolithic 
truism is to resort to a legal fiction. And, as has been stressed 
at several other points in the Treatise, legal fictions have no 
place in the interpretation of detailed modern statutes, such as 
compensation acts. Fictions were useful, if not indispensable, 
tool for the expansion and adaptation of the rigid common-law 
forms of action and other early common-law concepts. The 
form of action known as trover could be extended to cover all 
kinds of wrongful possession, by indulging the fiction that the 
defendant had found the goods. Lord Holt, at a time when the 
growth of business carried on through servants dictated the 
necessity for a principle of vicarious liability, could simply an-
nounce a fiction, "the act of the servant is the act of the 
master," and the problem was met.12 
It is one thing to resort to such fictions when the task is to 
create new law out of thin air, or to break down the artificial 
walls of old forms of action. It is quite another thing to take a 
statute consisting of 45 pages of fine print, complete with 
elaborate definitions of what the key words mean, and then 
announce judicially that those words do not mean what the 
legislature said they mean. 
Perhaps the best way to approach a correct analysis of the 
dual-persona concept is to provide illustrations of exceptional 
situations in which the concept can legitimately be employed. 
These will ordinarily be situations in which the law has already 
clearly recognized duality of legal persons, so that it may be 
realistically assumed that a legislature would have intended 
that duality to be respected. The duality may be one firmly 
entrenched in common law or equity. The status of a trustee 
or of a guardian is a familiar example of this. No such case has 
appeared in the reports, but one can readily hypothesize the 
n McAlister v. Methodist Hospital of Memphis, 550 S.W.2d 240, 246 
(Tenn. 1977). 
12 Jones v. Hart, [Nisi prius 1698] K.B. 642, 2 Salk. 441. See § 4.20, X. 3 
supra. 
VRei.10-4'83 Pub 347) 
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case of a trustee who, as trustee, is legal owner of a small 
business. If the question should arise whether this confers im-
munity on him as an individual for torts he commits upon 
employees of the trust business, no one would hesitate to an-
swer in the negative. 
The duality may also be created by modern statute, the 
obvious example being the one-man corporation. Here again, 
apart from exceptional circumstances justifying "piercing the 
corporate veil," it is assumed without question that the corpo-
ration is a separate legal persona—because the statute makes 
it so. 
The New York Court of Appeals in 1980 produced an inter-
esting variant on this theme involving a merger and the result-
ing posture of the successor corporation. In Billy v. 
Consolidated Machine Tool Corp.,12 claimant's decedent was 
killed by a piece of defective equipment manufactured by a 
corporation which had merged with the decedent's employer 
prior to the accident. Claimant received compensation from 
the employer. She then sued the employer in tort on the theo-
ry that it had assumed all of the obligations and liabilities of the 
manufacturing corporation when they had merged. The court 
held that claimant could sue the employer in tort, as a corpo-
rate successor, since it had assumed all of the obligations and 
liabilities of the third-party tort-feasor. The defective equip-
ment was manufactured before the merger and the decedent 
had never been employed by the manufacturing corporation. 
Thus his employer could not claim any inherited immunity 
from the manufacturing corporation, with which it had 
merged, by virtue of the exclusivity provision of workers' com-
pensation law. It would'be contrary to the beneficent purposes 
of compensation law to deprive a claimant of the rights to sue 
a third party in tort merely because the employer had merged 
with the third party tort-feasor corporation which had manu-
factured the defective equipment. The court said, "Having 
examined all of the pertinent precedent, we conclude that the 
13 51 N.Y.2d 152, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 412 N.E.2d 934 (1980), motion for 
reargument denied 52 N.Y.2d 829, 418 N.E.2d 69*4. 
•(Rel.10-4/83 Pub.347) 
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'dual capacity' doctrine as it has been applied to permit com-
mon law suits against employers in their capacities as property 
owners or manufacturers of plant equipment is fundamentally 
unsound."14 The Court of Appeals has thus performed a signal 
service in disavowing the distorted dual-capacity doctrine 
while, at the same time, demonstrating that a genuine case of 
separate legal personality can be satisfactorily dealt with under 
the dual persona doctrine. 
In the subsections that follow, the various categories of al-
leged dual capacity will be specifically examined. Most will be 
found clearly invalid. Few will be as clearly valid as the trustee 
i« 412 N.E.2d at 939. 
As to an unincorporated business, see Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 
178 Conn. 371, 423 A.2d 77 (1979). The employer, Valla, operated an unin-
corporated sole proprietorship under the name of Frank Valla Catering. An 
employee alleged that hi was injured by his employer's negligent operation 
of a truck at a time when his employer was acting as a "fellow employee" 
for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employer moved for, 
and was granted, summary judgment on the basis of the employee's failure 
to show that employer was a "fellow-employee," and of the employee's 
receipt of a workmen's compensation award for the injuries sustained. The 
employee appealed on the ground that his allegation of the "fellow-em-
ployee" relationship was enough of an allegation of material fact to bar 
summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that whether an 
employee is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act from maintaining 
an action against a tortfeasor is a question of law for the Court. In addition, 
the Court ruled that the employer's doing business under a separate name 
was not enough to confer upon him the "dual personality" of employer and 
employee. The court gave no opinion on what the result would have been 
if the business had been incorporated. 
As to a partnership, see Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., 110 Cal. App. 3d 605, 
163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). Claimant's employer, a food company, was a 
limited partner in a partnership agreement with a dairy products corpora-
tion which caused claimant's injuries. The dairy products corporation assert-
ed that, as general partner, it was also claimant's employer and therefore 
immune from common law tort liability. The court held that a partner may 
have a dual capacity in relation to the partnership employees. The general 
partner has the burden of proving it was acting in the capacity as a separate 
corporate entity promoting its own interest at the time claimant was injured. 
•(Rei.10-4/83 Pub 34?) 
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or the corporation. One or two are marginal, with possible 
arguments either way. 
§ 72.82 Owner or occupier of land 
It is held with virtual unanimity that an employer cannot be 
sued as the owner or occupier of land, whether the cause of 
action is based on common-law obligations of landowners or on 
statutes such as safe place statutes or structural work acts.15 
is Alaska: State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979). The claimant re-
ceived benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and then filed suit 
alleging the state, her employer, had failed to maintain properly the high-
way on which the injury occurred. The State moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that the claimant's suit was barred by the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Act. The superior court denied the motion and adopted the 
"dual capacity doctrine." The Alaska Supreme Court in reviewing the order 
rejected the "dual capacity doctrine." Workmen's compensation provides 
assured recovery to a worker without regard to fault and in return the law 
makes the workmen's compensation remedy the exclusive remedy. The 
"dual capacity doctrine" would have made an employer also liable in tort if, 
in respect to that tort, he was in a position which placed obligations on him 
distinct from his role as employer. This doctrine has been rejected in most 
jurisdictions, including Alaska. Its use would have undermined the policy to 
be achieved by workmen's compensation, which was certainty of remedy 
gained in return for limiting the liability of the employer. The doctrine 
would have emasculated the exclusive liability provision of the law. 
Illinois: Walker v. Berkshire Foods, Inc., 41 III. App. 3d 95,354 N.E.2d 626 
(1976). The claimant, a maintenance man, was injured as he fell through a 
section of roof he was using as a platform for window washing. His employer 
owned the building. The claimant attempted to bring an action against the 
employer under the Structural Work Act, asserting that the employer oper-
ated under a dual capacity which impressed him with independent tort 
liability as the owner of the building. The court affirmed the denial of 
compensation. It stated that, as far as the dual-capacity doctrine operated, 
independent tort actions were allowed only if the employer exists as two 
distinct legal entities. Here, the claimant had not alleged distinct entities or 
established dual capacity. The case of Marcus v. Green, 13 111. App. 3d 699, 
300 N.E.2d 512 (1973), was distinguished principally on the ground that the 
second "entity," that owned the building, was a partnership, of which the 
employer was a member, that could as such be more readily identified as a 
separate legal persona. But the court also hinted broadly that Marcus itself 
might have lost its authority. ("If the Marcus decision retains any viability. 
. . ." 354 N.E.2d 629.) The following succession of cases indicates strongly that 
the court', loubts about the viability of Marcus were well founded. 
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Apart from the basic argument that mere ownership of land 
does not endow a person with a second legal persona or entity, 
there is an obvious practical reason requiring this result. An 
employer, as part of his business, will almost always own or 
occupy premises, and maintain them as an integral part of 
conducting his business. If every action and function connect-
ed with maintaining the premises could ground a tort suit, the 
concept of exclusiveness of remedy would be reduced to a 
shambles. 
Although normally the premises involved are the work 
premises themselves, Iowa has gone further and has extended 
the circle of immunity to include an apartment building 
owned by the employer, which was not used in the business, 
but to which the plaintiff had been sent on a business errand.16 
The rule here stated applies also to a statutory employer, if 
Indiana: Kottis v. United States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976), 
§ 72.83, N. 21 infra under Indiana. 
Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. App. 1980). Gibson, sole owner 
of the employer corporation, owned the land. Held: he cannot be sued as 
landowner on a dual capacity theory. 
Iowa: Jansen v. Harmon, 164 iN.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1969). 
Louisiana: Herbert v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. 
1979), affd 395 So. 2d 832 (La. App. 1981). 
Nevada: Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 
(1976). 
New York: Minsky v. Baitelman, 281 App. Div. 910,120 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1953), 
involving an employee of a partnership suing a partner as building owner. 
South Carolina: Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65, 267 
S.E.2d 524 (1980). 
Tennessee: Billings v. Dugger, 50 Tenn. App. 403, 362 S.W.2d 49 (1962). 
Texas: Gore v. Amoco Production Co., 616 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1981). 
16
 Jansen v. Harmon, N. 15 immediately supra under Iowa. 
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the conditions for that status are met.17 But the opposite result 
may be achieved if the court concludes that the owner, al-
though qualified to be a general contractor, was not acting as 
a "contractor" on the particular project, and hence was not a 
statutory employer at all.18 
Moreover, if the circumstances are such that a president and 
sole stockholder of a corporation would be immune to suit by 
an employee,19 he does not lose that immunity by being also 
the owner of the land.20 
§ 72.83 Products liability 
All American jurisdictions but one hold that an employer, 
who is also the manufacturer, modifier, installer, or distributor 
of a product used in the work, cannot be held liable in damages 
to his own employee on a theory of products liability.21 Since 
(Text continued on page 14-75) 
17
 See, e.g., in N. 15 supra: Hebert v. Gulf States Utilities Co. (La.), Parker 
v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc. (S.C.), and Billings v. Dugger (Tenn.). 
18 See State v. Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1962). 
i* See § 72.10 N. 3 supra. 
20 Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. App. 1980). Defendant, the 
president and sole shareholder of the corporate employer and plaintiffs 
supervisor, could not be sued as a third party in his capacity as owner of the 
land. 
Vaughn v. Jermgan, 144 Ga. App. 745, 242 S.E.2d 482 (1978). 
21
 Alabama: Mapson v. Montgomery White Trucks, Inc., 357 So. 2d 971 
(Ala. 1978). 
Arizona: Vineyard v. Southwest Engineering & Contracting, 117 Ariz. 52, 
570 P.2d 823 (1977). The workman was injured in an industrial accident and 
was awarded compensation benefits. He contended that, because a collec-
tive bargaining agreement provided for the installation by the employer of 
safety devices and because the installation of such safety devices could have 
at least partially avoided his injuries, he was entitled to proceed directly 
against the employer in a suit for damages. The court rejected the work-
man's contention, concluding that, because the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not make the employer responsible for personal injury damages 
arising out of the breach of the safety provisions, there was no direct promise 
for the third party beneficiary to enforce. t4[I]n view of the exclusivity provi-
•(Rel 10-4/83 Pub 347) 
14-73 WHO ARE "THIRD PERSONS" § 72 .83 
sions of the [Workmen's Compensation] Statute which are 'part of the quid 
pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are 
to some extent put in balance,' absent an express agreement, the workmen's 
compensation laws should offer the exclusive remedy." Treatise quoted. 
Illinois: Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machines, Inc., 82 111. App. 3d 1054, 38 
111. Dec. 324, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1980). Although the plaintiffs employer had 
manufactured the machine which injured the plaintiff, he did not thereby 
stand in so different a position to the plaintiff employee as to warrant finding 
him subject, under the dual capacity doctrine, to a negligence suit. Since the 
machine was used to aid the employer's business, construction of the ma-
chine was auxiliary to the business. The employer's duty therefore flowed 
from the employment relationship, and not from his manufacture of the 
machine. Treatise quoted. 
Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 111. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977). 
Indiana: Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 359 
N.E.2d 544 (1977). The claimant was burned over 40% of his body when a 
pressure cooker, which his employer had designed, manufactured and in-
stalled, exploded and sprayed him with scalding grease. He urged that his 
suit at law be maintained against the employer under a dual capacity theory. 
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's dismissal. It found the injury 
"precisely of the kind" to be covered by workmen's compensation, and that 
it did not arrive from an obligation apart from the employer-employee 
relationship. The court also noted that the claimant's argument would do 
considerable violence to the exclusive nature of the compensation remedy. 
Kentucky: Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. App. 1981), 
§ 72.81 N. 10.1 supra. 
Louisiana: Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d 599 (La. 
App. 1978), cert, denied 362 So. 2d 1389. 
Massachusetts: Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 857 
(Mass. 1980). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts here rejects flatly 
the application of the dual capacity doctrine in a case involving an employer 
who was also the manufacturer of the allegedly defective product. The court 
said "[I]n this case the defendant was performing its common law function 
as an employer in supplying equipment, tools, and machinery to the [em-
ployee's] division. The plaintiffs argument therefore must fail as he 'over-
look^] the simple fact that the use of the product was a routine and integral 
part of the employment. Dual capacity requires a distinct separate legal 
persona, not just a separate theory of liability in the same legal person.' 2A, 
A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 72.80, at 154 (Supp. 1979)." 
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Michigan: Peoples v. Chrysler Corp., 98 Mich. App. 277, 296 N.W.2d 237 
(1980). The plaintiff brought a tort action against his employer seeking dam-
ages for the injuries he received while working with an employer-provided 
lubricating machine. The action was based on a separate manufacturer-user 
relationship between the employer and employee. The court refused to 
allow the "end-run around the statute," and affirmed the employer's grant 
of summary judgment. 
See also: Neal v. Roura Iron Works, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 
837 (1975). The plaintiff was injured on the job when a glove, sold to him 
by his employer, caught in a drill press. The court ruled that workmen's 
compensation was his exclusive remedy, rejecting his argument that the suit 
was based on a vendor-vendee relationship. 
Nevada: Noland v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 628 P.2d 1123 (Nev. 
1981). 
North Dakota: Latendresse v. Preskey, 290 N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1980). 
Pennsylvania: Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070, rev'd 
on other grounds 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981). A large number of 
plaintiffs brought suits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against several 
manufacturers of asbestos products. Although many of the plaintiffs or their 
decedents had been employed by the manufacturers they were suing, they 
contended that, despite the state's workmen's compensation act, the em-
ployers should still be liable for products liability under a dual capacity 
doctrine. In order to ensure uniformity among the district courts in the 
district, the chief judge of the district appointed a four-judge panel to hear 
arguments on the issue. The panel concluded that, although Pennsylvania 
courts had not yet considered the dual capacity doctrine, they would be 
likely to follow the majority and refuse to accept dual capacity. Therefore, 
the court concluded that the dual capacity doctrine would be unavailable to 
plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Texas: Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
Virginia: White v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 523 F. Supp. 302 (W.D. 
Va. 1981). The plaintiff, an employee in an Orion-making plant, had alleged-
ly suffered liver damage from being exposed to a chemical, dimethylforma-
mide (DMF), which was used by his employer, duPont, in making orlon. 
After being denied compensation benefits, he brought this tort action 
against duPont as manufacturer of DMF. The court, noting that Virginia-had 
not adopted the dual capacity doctrine, and indeed had not produced a case 
that even came close to adopting it, declined to apply it. 
Wisconsin: Gerger v. Campbell, 98 Wis. 2d 282, 297 N.W.2d 183 (1980). 
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California abolished the dual-capacity doctrine by statutory 
amendment in August, 1982,22 only Ohio23 holds contra. 
All the arguments in § 72.81 against this distortion of the 
22
 Assembly Bill No. 684 amending § 3602 o£ the Labor Code. The amend-
ment contains one or two exceptions, which in practice will be inconsequen-
tial. It is poignant to reflect that California, which originated the 
dual-capacity doctnne, and which expanded it to the most preposterous 
extreme, first in Douglas v E. & J Gallo Winery, 169 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 
Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977), and finally in Bell v Industrial Vangas, Inc., 179 Cal. 
Rptr. 30, 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P 2d 266 (1981), may now have the most 
restrictive rule of all on dual capacity This is because the amendment makes 
no exception even for the occasional true dual-persona situation. 
" Mercer v Umroyal, Inc , 49 Ohio App 2d 279, 361 N E.2d 492 (1977). 
The plaintiff, a truckdnver furnished by a lease agreement to Uniroval, was 
injured m a crash which occurred when the truck in which he was riding had 
a blowout. The defective tire was manufactured bv Uniroval. The plaintiff 
brought an action for personal injuries predicated on product liability Sum-
mary judgment was granted for Umroyal. On appeal, the plaintiff contended 
that his status was not that of an injured emplovee, but that of a reasonablv 
foreseeable user The majority agreed and reversed summary judgment. 
The majority acknowledged that the plaintiff, as a leased employee, was able 
to collect workmen's compensation. However, applying the doctnne of dual 
capacity for the first time, they found Umroyal liable as manufacturer of the 
defective tire The blowout and resulting crash were seen as hazards com-
mon to the public, not peculiar to the conditions of employment. Since the 
cause of the injuries did not arise from the emplover-employee relationship, 
the majority held it permissible for the plaintiff to sue Umroyal in two 
capacities. They noted that it was only a matter of circumstance that the 
defective tire was not another brand. The dissenting justice vigorously ob-
jected to the introduction of the dual capacity doctrine into Ohio law, assert-
ing that it was contrary to the fundamental doctrines of compensation law. 
Cf. Knous v Ridge Machine Co , 64 Ohio App. 2d 251,18 Ohio Op. 3d 220, 
413 N E.2d 1218 (1980). Plaintiffs decedent was killed while repairing a die 
casting machine that was manufactured by his employer. Plaintiff brought 
a wrongful death action on the dual capacitv theory The court held that an 
employer who manufactured or designed and assembled a machine for the 
use of its own employees in its own production operations, and not for use 
by the general public, was not subject to a manufacturer's liability when his 
own employee was injured while repairing or using that machine. Treatise 
quoted. 
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dual persona concept apply with full force here, and need not 
be repeated. It may be added that, even under the most per-
missive definition of dual capacity, the Ohio view cannot be 
justified. The second set of obligations, under that definition, 
must be independent of the defendant's obligations as an em-
ployer. Here they are completely intertwined. The employer 
has a duty as employer to provide safe scaffolding; he has a 
duty as manufacturer to make safe scaffolding; if he makes 
unsafe scaffolding and provides it to his employee to be used 
in his work, the two obligations are braided together so tightly 
they cannot possibly be separated. As the Illinois court said, 
since the machine was used to aid the employer's business, 
construction of the machine was auxiliary to business.24 
This being so, it really does not help the Ohio position to 
limit dual capacity, as it has done, to cases in which the product 
is sold to the public as well as furnished to the employee.25 
What matters is that, as to this emploijee, the product was 
manufactured as an adjunct of the business, and furnished to 
him solely as an employee, not as a member of the consuming 
public. What the employer does with the rest of his output 
cannot change this central fact. 
§ 72.84 Departments or divisions of a single employer 
§ 72.84(a) Private employers 
Dual capacity or persona will not be found merely because 
the employer has a number of departments or divisions that 
perhaps are quite separate in their functions and operations. 
In the case of private employers, this result has been 
reached in a variety of combinations of divisions or depart-
ments, such as a design department and an installation depart-
24
 Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machine, Inc., N. 21 supra this subsection 
under Illinois. 
25
 Knous v. Ridge Machine Co., N. 23 supra tHis subsection. 
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ment,26 a drug store and a laundromat operated by the same 
employer,27 the Talon Division of Textron Inc.,28 a separate 
division of the employer that manufactured the vat29 or the 
machine30 involved in the injury, and the American Bridge 
division of U.S. Steel.31 
§ 72.84(b) Local governments 
Attempts have several times been made to subdivide a 
municipality, and assert common-law rights on behalf of an 
employee of one city department against a different city de-
partment as if it were a stranger. These attempts have also 
been consistently unsuccessful.32 Thus, when a city has both a 
fire department and a street railway line, the widow of a fire-
man killed by the street railway's negligence cannot maintain 
a death action against the city in its capacity as street railway 
operator.33 
26 Miller v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Va. 1969). 
27 Hudson v. Allen, 161 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. App. 1968). 
28 Strickland v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 326 (D. S.C. 1977). 
29 Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp,, 150 NJ . Super. 48,374 A.2d 1222 (App. 
Div. 1977). 
30
 Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 857 (Mass. 1980). 
31
 Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1980). 
32
 California: Walker v. City & County of San Francisco, 97 Cal. App. 2d 
901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950). 
Michigan: Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 14 (1933). 
New York: De Guiseppe v. City of New York, 188 Misc. 897, 66 N.Y.S.2d 
866, affd 273 App. Div. 1010, 79 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1948). 
Washington: Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 
(1979). 
33
 Walker v. City & County of San Francisco, N. 32 immediately supra 
under California. 
•(Rel. 10-4/83 Pub.347) 
§ 72.84(c) THIRD PARTY ACTIONS 14-78 
§ 72.84(c) State governments 
Similarly, at the state level, an employee of the Department 
of Highways, who was injured when struck by an automobile 
driven by a state trooper of the Department of Public Safety, 
could not bring an action of law against the Department of 
Public Safety, since both employees were employees of the 
commonwealth.34 
§ 72.84(d) Federal government 
A version of the dual-capacity principle at the federal level 
was also rejected in Denenberg v. United States.35 By statute36 
employees of nonappropriated Fund activities, such as the 
P.X. in London, are to be provided workmen's compensation 
coverage equal to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act benefits, and this is made the exclusive 
remedy for an injured employee. The court held that a claim 
for injuries suffered by the plaintiff which prevented her pur-
suing her musical career could not be sustained in the Court 
of Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, since the United 
States did not waive immunity when, by statute, another ex-
clusive remedy was provided. Summary judgment was ren-
dered for the United States. 
§ 72.85 Automobile owner's liability 
The New York case of Costanza v. Mackler27 has some of the 
34 Osborne v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. App. 1962). 
Accord, as to maintenance of highways: 
State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979). 
Wright v. Moore, 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1979), writ denied 382 So. 2d 
164 (La. 1980). 
35 305 F.2d 378 (Ct. CI. 1962). 
36 5 U.S.C.A. § 150(10 (1957). 
37 34 Misc. 2d 188, 227 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1962), dffd 17 A.D.2d 948, 233 
NT.Y.S.2d 1816. 
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characteristics of a dual-persona case. The holding was that the 
coemployee immunity created by the New York Act did not 
extend to the defendant employee as owner of the truck in-
volved in the accident, and that therefore he could be held 
liable under the New York vehicle owner's liability law. The 
defendant regularly rented two trucks to his employer. The 
alleged tort was based on the condition of the truck. A loose 
floorboard had struck the plaintiff, a fellow employee of the 
defendant. The court made short work of the issue by as-
similating it to the situation in which the coemployee was not 
in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, 
and concluded: 
"The alleged tort charged of the defendant is indepen-
dent of and not related to the common employment of both 
"38 
It should be observed, however, that the Costanza problem 
is not identical to that in the course-of-employment cases. In 
Costanza the truck, so to speak, was in the course of employ-
ment at the time of injury. The defendant was being sued as 
truck owner for his own negligence in that capacity. In this 
respect the case differs from an earlier case in which, when the 
negligence was that of a coemployee driving defendant em-
ployee's car, suit against the defendant employee was held 
barred.39 Here there was indeed "negligence or wrong of an-
other in the same employ," as required by the New York stat-
ute, so that the statute could take hold on the strength of the 
driver's status as coemployee, not the defendant's status as 
coemployee. In Costanza the defendant was relying on his 
own status as coemployee, and to defeat this defense it is neces-
sary to say that his negligence in furnishing a defective truck 
was not conduct in his capacity as coemployee. 
38 227 N.Y.S.2d at 751. 
39
 Naso v. Lafata, § 72.24, N. 22 supra. 
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§ 72.86 Other dual-persona problems 
In two cases, plaintiffs have attempted to invoke the dual 
capacity doctrine by assigning the employer a second role as 
self-insurer. Both attempts were rightly rebuffed.40 
Equally illogical and futile was one plaintiffs effort to find 
a second persona in the fact that the employer had assumed 
certain special responsibilities through a collectively-bar-
gained contract calling for installation of certain safety de-
vices.41 
Finally, it may be noted that the important dual-persona 
problem of doctors, hospitals and providers of health services 
has for convenience been analyzed in connection with the 
40 Swain v. J.G. Hudson Co., 60 Mich. App. 361, 230 N.W.2d 433 (1975). 
The plaintiff a t tempted to sue the decedent 's employer, a self-insurer, for 
negligence. It was alleged that, since an insurer could be sued as a third party 
for its own negligence, an employer which was a self-insurer could be sued 
in its capacity as an insurer only. The court held that the plaintiffs work-
men's compensation remedy against her employer was exclusive. 
Denman v. Duval Sierrita Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 684, 558 P.2d 712 (1976) 
(rehearing denied) (review denied). The claimant brought suit against his 
employer in its capacity as self-insurer. The court dismissed the action as an 
illogical a t tempt to get around the exclusivity provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
41
 Vineyard v. Southwest Engineering & Contracting, 117 Ariz. 52, 570 
P.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1977). The workman was injured in an industrial accident 
and was awarded compensation benefits. He contended that, because a 
collective bargaining agreement provided for the installation by the employ-
er of safety devices and because the installation of such safety devices could 
have at least partially avoided his injuries, he was entitled to proceed directly 
against the employer in a suit for damages. The court rejected the work-
man's contention, concluding that, because the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not make the employer responsible for personal injury damages 
arising out of the breach of the safety provisions, there was no direct promise 
for the third party beneficiary to enforce. 4t[I]n view of the exclusivity provi-
sions of the [Workmen's Compensation] Statute which are 'part of the quid 
pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are 
to some extent put in balance,' absent an express agreement, the workmen's 
compensation laws should offer the exclusive remedy." 
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general subject of physicians as third parties.42"76 
§ 72.90 Insurer as third party 
§ 72.91 Summary of case and statute law on insurers as 
third parties 
Of all the developments in the volatile field of third-party 
litigation under workmen's compensation, none has been so 
dramatic and fast-moving as the line of cases, mostly during 
the 'sixties, in which injured employees have attempted to 
treat the compensation carrier as a third party for purposes of 
tort suits, usually on the basis of alleged negligence in either 
safety inspections or medical services. Legislatures too were 
busy, sometimes reversing the courts, sometimes confirming 
them, and sometimes doing a little of each. The net result is 
that, among states that have specifically dealt with the subject, 
by either judicial decision or legislative amendment or both, 
carriers are immune in nineteen77 states and suable in seven.78 
42-7« See § 72.63 supra. 
77
 Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin. 
78
 Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, and Okla-
homa. 
But cf. Brooks v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 20, 405 A.2d 
466 (1979). The claimant was injured by an allegedly defective machine at 
work, and was awarded workmen's compensation benefits. He then institut-
ed a negligence action against his employer's worker's compensation insur-
er, charging that it had failed to discover or remedy the hazard which 
injured him when it had conducted safety inspections of the plant. A tnal 
judge granted summary judgment to both defendants, and the claimant 
appealed. The superior court, appellate division, affirmed the decision of the 
tnal judge. The court held that the claimant had no cause of action against 
the insurer when the policy permitted but did not require safety inspections, 
and when the policy contained an express statement that any inspection 
undertaken was to benefit the insurer and not to warrant the premises as 
safe. 
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Provisions of Workers' Compensation Law forecloaed 
plaintiff from sung his employer for injuries sustained while 
assisting in semcuig of printing press and, assuming that 
repair specialist sent by defendant to service press became a 
special employee of plaintiff's employer, thereby becoming a 
coemployee of plaintiff, plaintiff was foreclosed from suing 
repair specialist as well, but in absence of an employment 
relationship between ptamtiif and defendant, plaintiffs right 
to maintain mi action against defendant remained mtact 
whether or not a special employment relationship between 
repair sncaahsf and plamtnTs employer existed. Id. 
No special employment relationship could be said to have 
amen helwum puuntnT and defendant manufacturer during 
time repair specialist sent by defendant was on premises of 
phuntni s employer to service a printing press; where there 
was no evidence that plaintiff or ms employer ever spoke to 
defendant about plaintiff, that defendant exercised or main-
tained any right or control and supervision ever phnnmT, er 
that phunofT ever performed work upon defendant's premis-
es Id. 
A finding of a special employment relationship bttween 
puuntnTs employer and repair specialist sent by defendant 
manufacturer to service printing press on employer's premis-
es did not compel a verdict in favor of defendant in suit by 
plaintiff for injuries' sustained during course of servicing 
operation smce, though plaintiff was foreclosed from suing 
repair specialist m event latter was a special employee of 
pfauntnTs employer and, thus, a coemployee of plaintiff, 
plaintiffs nght to maintain an action against defendant as 
general employer of repair specialist remained intact M. 
19.5. Prassmpoons and burden of proof 
Dairy products company, in order to establish affirmative 
defense that injured deliveryman's exclusive remedy was 
under Workmen's Compensation Act, had to prove that 
injurious conduct of which the deliveryman complained was 
conduct by the dairy products company on behalf of part-
nership, which was the deliveryman's immediate employer, 
and not that such conduct was that of the dairy products 
company in its capacity as proprietor of its own corporate 
dairy products business, which was also general partner in 
the partnership Dorado v Knudsen Corp (1980) 163 
CaLRptr 477, 103 C A 3d 605 
19.6. Nonsuits 
In suit brought against steel subcontractor by general 
concrete contractor's employee, who was injured in a crane 
accident while the crane was being operated for the benefit 
of plaintiff's employer, the evidence was susceptible of an 
inference that no special employment relationship arose 
between plaintiffs employer and defendant's crane operator, 
accordingly, the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit for 
defendant Marsh v Tilley Steel Co (1980) 162 Cal Rptr 
320 
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Since ptamtuT* nght to sue defendant manufacturer for 
uyunea ——imrd wink repair iproahst jent by defendant 
was servicing a printing press on premises of plaintiff's 
employer remaned mtact m event an employment relation-
ship did not exist between plaintiff and defendant, instruc-
tion winch erroneously failed to preserve this nght was 
prerueucial awd operated to require reversal even though it 
was partly correct m stating that if plaintiff became a special 
employee of defendant, he could see neither drfrnriant nor 
m repav spmahat Campbell v Hams-Scybold Press Co. 
(1977) 141 CaLRptc 55. 73 CA.3d 786, 
A cootnrfhwg pnoaple of Workers' Compensation Act 
was that workers' ooinpenaatxxs appeals board had exclusive 
jurisdiction when conditions of compensation concurred, 
and since discharged employee, who brought action against 
ha employer and general manager on theory of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress ansing out of two encounters 
between employee and manager at employer's premises, 
alleged that he was physically injured and disabled as a 
result of defendant's acts, he suffered a compensable injury 
under Act, and thus the conditions of compensation were 
met and he was barred from bringing a civil suit for 
damages predicated on theory of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Gates v Trans Video Corp (1979) 155 
CaLRptr 486, 93 CA.3d 196. 
Exclusive remedy provisions of this section barred em-
ployee's civil action against his employer and fellow employ-
ees for intentional infliction of emotional distress where 
physical illness and disability accompanied the emotional 
distress. Ankeny v Lockheed Missiles and Space Co 
(1979) 151 CaLRptr 828, 88 CA.3d 531 
An employee^ crvd action against his employer and fel-
low employees for intentional infhcoon of emotional distress 
a not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of this 
secMic Reatena v Orange County (1978) 147 Cal Rptr 
447, 82 CA-3d 833. 
22. Review 
Defendant who failed to plead and prove, as affirmative 
defense of action, but conditions of workers compensation 
rendering him subject to protections of the act existed could 
not raise such contention on appeal and decision to such 
effect did not result m improper -conferral'* of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction by means of consent, waiver or estoppel nor 
was such decision altered by fact that defendant sought to 
raise defense in question by means of motion for nonsuit 
filed at conclusion of plaintiffs case m chief as well as by 
posttnai motions for new trial and judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict Doncy v Tambouratgis (1979) 151 Cal Rptr 
347, 587 P2d 1160, 23 C3d 91 
§ 3602. Exclusive remedy; action "for damages; conditions of employer's liability 
(a) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the ng! 
such compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 3706j ht to recover and 4558, the 
sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer, and the 
fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at 
the time of, the employee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to nplo 
: lav bring an action at l w for damages against the employer. 
(b) An employee, or his or her dependents in the event of his or her death, may bring; ai 
law for damages against the employer, as if this division did not apply, in the following 
n action at 
instances 
(1) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a willful physical assault by the 
employer 
Underline indicates changes or additions by amendment 
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Uot» 9 
(2) Where the employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the 
existence of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the employer's liability 
shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the aggravation. The burden of proof 
respecting apportionment of damages between the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is 
upon the employer. 
(3) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a defective product manufac-
tured by the employer and sold, leased, or otherwise transferred for valuable consideration to an 
independent third person, and that product is thereafter provided for the employee's use by a third 
person. 
(cj In all cases where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 do not concur, the 
liability of the employer * * * shall be the same as if this division had not been enacted. 
(Amended by Stats.1982, c 922, p. 3367, § 6.) 
19*2 
Law Review < 
Monitoring employees for genetic alteration: Is state reg-
ulation essentia?? (1984) 15 Pacific LJ. 349. 
Remedy for intentional torts of a workmen's compensa-
tion carrier. Everett E. Dernier (1973) 1 Pepperdine L.Rev. 
54. 
Notes of Decisions 
Dud capacity 5 
Instruction* 3 
4 
1. l« 
Principle that exclusive remedy provisions do not alter 
correlative rights and liabilities of parties who do not occupy 
reciprocal statutes of employer and employee is not muted 
by fact that employee was injured by a third party with 
whom employer of injured party had entered into a consen-
sual legal relationship. Campbell v. Harris-Seybold Press 
Co. (1977) 141 CaLRptr. 55, 73 CA-3d 786. 
A finding of a special employment relationship between 
njaintiff s employer and repair specialist sent by defendant 
manufacturer to service printing press on employer's premis-
es did not compel a verdict m favor of defendant in suit by 
plaintiff for injuries sustained during course, of servicing 
operation since, though plaintiff was foreclosed from suing 
repair specialist in event latter was a special employee of 
plaintiffs employer and, thus, a coempioyee of plaintiff, 
plaintiffs right to maintain an action against defendant as 
general employer of repair specialist remained intact. Id. 
Provisions of Workers* Compensation Law foreclosed 
plaintiff from suing his employer for injuries sustained while 
assisting in servicing of printing press and assuming that 
repair specialist sent by defendant to service press became a 
special employee of plaintiffs employer, thereby becoming a 
coempioyee of plaintiff, plaintiff was foreclosed from suing 
repair specialist as well, but in absence of an employment 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiffs right 
to maintain his action against defendant remained intact 
whether or not a special employment relationship between 
repair specialist and plaintiffs employer existed. Id. 
2. Civil actions 
Liberal construction is mandated in favor of Workers' 
Compensation Act's § 3201 et seq. applicability to civil suits 
as well as compensation proceedings. Iverson v. Atlas 
Pacific Engmernng (1983) 191 CaLRptr. 696, 143 C A J d 
219. 
la employee's common-law damage action against Us 
employer's parent corporation as a third-party tort-feasor, 
evidence that control and direction of employee was vested 
in and exercised by employer, and not the parent corpora-
tion, precluded summary judgment for parent, who alleged 
that employee's sole remedy was under worker's compensa-
tion scheme. Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 186 
CaLRptr. 395, 136 CA.3d 591. 
Instruction which had effect of compelling a verdict in 
favor of defendant as general employer of repair specialist in 
event a special employment relationship existed between 
plaintiffs employer and specialist when he was sent to 
premises of plaintiffs employer to service a printing press 
was erroneous since, in absence of an employment relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiffs right to 
maintain an action against defendant remained intact despite 
status of specialist Campbell v. Harris-Seyboki Press Co. 
(1977) 141 CaLRptr. 55, 73 CA.3d 786. 
Since plaintiffs right to sue defendant manufacturer for 
injuries nwrainrd while repair specialist sent by defendant 
was servicing a printing press on premises of plaintiffs 
employer remained intact in event an employment relation-
ship did not exist between plaintiff and defendant, instruc-
tion which erroneously failed to preserve this right was 
prejudicial and operated to require reversal even though it 
was partly correct in stating that if plaintiff became a special 
employee of defendant, he could sue neither defendant nor 
its repair specialist. Campbell v. Harris-Seybold Press Co. 
(1977) 141 CaLRptr. 55, 73 CA.3d 786. 
Slander action by former deputy sheriff against sheriff was 
not barred by exclusive provisions of this section; gist of 
action for slander is damage to reputation, which is not type 
of injury contemplated by Workers' Compensation-Act 
(§ 3201 et seq.). Howland v. Balma (1983) 192 CaLRptr. 
286, 143<lAJd 899. 
5. Dnai capacity 
Rip saw operator's claim against his employer to recover 
for injuries sustained when piece-of lumber "kicked back** 
. was barred by exclusivity provision of § 3601 xnd did not 
fall within the so-called "dual capacity'* exception as risk of 
"kick back" was an inherent risk of the job and the employ-
er bad taken measures to obviate or minimize that danger 
and it was only mere chance that the allegedly defective 
piece of wood was retained for employer's use rather than 
sold on open market Franco v. United Wholesale Lumber 
Co. (App. 2 Distl983) 196 CaLRptr. 430. 148 C.A.3d 981. 
Asterisks * * * indicate deletions by amendment 
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Administrative Code References 5df^ 
Certificate of consent to self-insure, see 8 CaLAdm. Code et seq. 
15350 et seq 
Revocation of certificate of self-insurance, see 8 CaLAdm.' 
Code 15420 et seq 
»admuustratxn, toe 8 CaLAdm. Code 15200 
§ 3702.7. Revocation of certificate of consent; fines 
A certificate of consent to administer claims of s e l f ^ , ^ employers may be revoked by the 
director at any time for good cause after a hearing. G o ^
 CSiuae mc\u^Sf but is not limited to, the 
violation of subsection (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subdivision
 (a) o f Section 3702. In lieu of revocation of 
a certificate of consent, the director may impose a fine
 Qf n o t l e s s t ^ f^ d o I l a r s $&) n o r m o r e 
than five hundred dollars ($500) for each violation. 
(Added by Stats. 1984, c 1521, p. — , § 4, operative Jurj
 ly ^^^ 
Operative July 1, ^ 5 
§ 3704. Repealed by Stats. 1984, c 252, p. — , § 4, u*gcncy> cff# J u n e 27, 1 9 8 4 
§ 3706. Effect of failure to secure payment of c o m p e ^ ^ , , .
 a c t i o n f o r damages 
If any employer fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his 
dependents may * • • bnng an action at law against s u ^ employer for damages, as if this division 
did not apply. 
™ ~ * and worker could continue to pursue both remedies. 
Id. 
*"^Ung physician could be sued independent of his 
e m
^°^er company for alleged malpractice m aggravation of 
^PJ°Vee's industrially incurred injury. Hodman v. Roges 
(1972)
 w CaLRptr. 455, 22 CA.3d 655. 
proceeding—la general 
""^re claimant made no showing that he had not been 
Pai~J^mpensati0n in accordance with his claim as required 
*° ^"^g him within the exception in tins section allowing a 
separau cavil action against employer for damages, he could 
not, aft^
 h B c I a i 0 1 jy^j yX)Cn jg^j^j JUXJ settlement had been 
approv^j ^ workmen's compensation appeal board, mam-
tmn a chon against employer for same amines on theory that 
cmPJ°^er was guilty of wilful and reckless conduct Nelson 
*
 Mf*lclad Insulation Corp. (1975) 118 CaLRptr 725, 44 
C A.3<*
 4 7 4 
Tn%ttonal notions of fairness argue against holding that 
m c r e
 fying of workmen's compensation claim operates as 
binding election ^ proceed to conclusion before workmen's 
COfnpchsation appeals board. Felix v. Workmen's Compcn-
sitl0n
 Appeals Bd (1974) 116 Cal.Rptr 345, 41 C.A3d 
759 
1971 Amendment. Deleted a provision which allowed a 
proceeding against an employer by filing an application for 
compensation with the appeals board in addition to the 
present method. 
Law Renew Commentaries 
Litigation reduction in workmen's compensation. (1972) 
1 West StU.L.Rev. 87. 
Remedy for intentional torts of a workmen's compensa-
tion earner. Everett E Dernier (1973) 1 Pepperdme L-Rev. 
54 
Notes of Decisions 
L In general 
Where at the time injured worker filed workmen's com-
pensation claim he was unaware of extent of employer's 
workmen's compensation or public liability insurance be-
cause of employer's refusal to answer interrogatories dealing 
with his insurance, worker was not "apprised of the facts" 
to extent that worker could be estopped from proceeding m 
civil action, and it wa* thus reasonable for worker to 
proceed m workmen's compensation claim and civil action 
and pursue them concurrently through discovery stages until 
it could be decided which afforded remedy Felix v Work-
me»%s Compensation Appeal Bd /)9?4> )U> Cti.Jlptr M5, 
41 C.A.3d 759 
Employer's payment of cost of injured worker's transpor-
tation for medical examination and disposition did not result 
in prejudice to employer which would collaterally estop 
worker from proceeding tn civil action since such expenses 
would have been incurred by employer m civil action in any 
event and since information was produced that was valuable 
to defense of either workmen's compensation proceeding or 
civil action. Id. 
Although injured worker filed workmen's compensation 
proceeding before filing civil action and worker had, under 
court order, received answers to interrogatones concerning 
employer's insurance, election of remedies had not been 
12. Headings, actions and proceedings 
Bur
^en of employer to show, as affirmative defense to 
*
CI,on
* that workmen's compensation coverage provides ex-
elusive remedy available to plamtftT includes showing, 
through appropriate pleading and proof, that defendant 
s e c u rSd the payment of compensation" in accordance with 
Pro^Sns of the act Doney v Tambouratgis (1979) 151 
C a L RPtr. 347, 587JP 2d 1W0, 23 C3d 91. 
* • "~— Defenses, w general, actions and proceedings 
or not undisputed acts by alleged employer in 
a r r a nS ,ng for worker's compensation policy, paying SI,000, 
*""
 lnVn deducting some payments from employee-hauler's 
P*v lc8ally constituted secunng payment of compensation so 
that «npj0yer could claim as an affirmative defense that 
worker
 s compensation coverage provided exclusive remedy 
a abjc in action arising out of alleged wrongful death of 
Underline i n d i t e ,
 c h a n g e s or additions by amendment 
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9 4553.1. Required findings 
In order to support a holding of serious and willful misconduct by an employer based upon 
violation of a safety order, the appeals board must specifically find all of the following: 
• » • 
(1} The specific manner in which the order was violated. • • • 
(2) That the violation of the safety order did proximately cause the injury or death, and the specific 
manner in which the violation constituted the proximate cause. 
(3) That the safety order, and the conditions making the safety order applicable, were known to, 
and violated by, a particular named person, either the employer, or a representative designated by 
Section 4553, or that the condition making the safety order applicable was obvious, created a 
probability of serious injury, and that the failure of the employer, or a representative designated by 
Section 4553, to correct the condition constituted a reckless disregard for the probable consequences. 
(Amended by Stats.1982, c 922, p. 3369, § 11.) 
1982 Amendment. Rewrote tbe section. 
§ 4554. Employer's failure to secure payment of compensation 
Cross References and attorney's fees assessed against employer because of his 
Agency or organization performing officiating services willful failure to secure workmen's compensation. Bores v. 
relating to amateur sporting events, application of section, Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1974) 113 CalRptr. 
see § 3706.5. 217, 520 P.2d 1033, 11 C3d 171. 
The ten percent increase in compensation recoverable for 
willful failure of the employer to insure as provided in this 
Notes of Decisions section, and the reasonable attorney's fee in addition to the 
1. Construction and application amount of compensation recoverable that may be awarded 
Uninsured employers fund was required to pay employee under Labor C. § 4555 ts not chargeable to the uninsured 
full award of workmen's compensation award for which his employer's rand. Flores v. Falcon (1973) 38 CaiComp. 
employer would be liable, including ten percent "penalty" Cases 667. 
§ 4555. Attorney's fees 
Gross References The ten percent increase in compensation recoverable for 
Agency or organization performing officiating services willful failure of the employer to insure as provided in Ubor 
relating to amateur sporting events, application of section, C. § 4 5*4- and the reasonable attorney's fee in addition to 
see § 3706.5. t n c amount of compensation recoverable that may be award-
ed under this section is not chargeable to the uninsured 
employer's ftind. Flores v. Falcon (1973) 38 CaLComp. 
Cases 667. 
Notes of Decisions „ 
2. Failure to secure payment 
L In general Under this section to effect that, in case of failure by 
Uninsured employers fund was required to pay employee employer to secure payment of workmen's compensation, 
full award of workmen's compensation award for which his appeals board may award reasonable attorney's fee in addi-
employer would be liable, including ten percent "penalty" tion to amount of compensation recoverable, the additional 
and attorney's fees assessed against employer because of his award is applicable whenever employer fails to secure com-
willful failure to secure workmen's compensation. Flores v. pensation, whether failure is willful or not. Flores v. Work-
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1974) 113 Cal.Rptr. men's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1974) 113 CalRptr. 217, 
217, 520 P.2d 1033, 11 C3d 171. 520 P.2d 1033, 11 C3d 171. 
§ 4558. Removal or noninstallation of power press guards; definitions; actions for injury or 
death; proof required; contribution 
(a) As used in this section: 
(1) "Employer" means a named identifiable person who is, prior to the time of the employee's 
injury or death, an owner or supervisor having managerial authority to direct and control the acts of 
employees. 
(2) "Failure to install" means omitting to attach a point of operation guard either provided or 
required by the manufacturer, when the attachment is required by the manufacturer and made 
Asterisks * * * Indicate deletions by amendment 
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known by him or her to the employer at the time of acquisition, installation, or manufacturer-re-
quired modification of the power press. 
(3) "Manufacturer" means the designer, fabricator, or assembler of a power press. 
(4) 'Tower press" means any material-forming machine that utilizes a die which is designed for 
use in the manufacture of other products. 
(5) "Removal" means physical removal of a point of operation guard which is either installed by 
the manufacturer or installed by the employer pursuant to the requirements or instructions of the 
manufacturer. 
(6) "Specifically authorized" means an affirmative instruction issued by the employer prior to the 
time of the employee's physical injury or death, but shall not mean any subsequent acquiescence in, 
or ratification of, removal of a point of operation safety guard 
(b) An employee, or his or her dependents "in the "event of the employee's death, may bring an 
action at law for damages against the employer where the employee's injury or death is proximately 
caused by the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation 
guard on a power press, and this removal or failure to install is specifically authorized by the 
employer under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death. 
(c) No liability shall arise under this section absent proof that the manufacturer designed, 
installed, required, or otherwise provided by specification for the attachment of the guards and 
conveyed knowledge of the same to the employer. Proof of conveyance of this information to the 
employer by the manufacturer may come from any source. 
(d) No right of action for contribution or indemnity by any defendant shall exist against the 
employer; however, a defendant may seek contribution after the employee secures a judgment 
against the employer pursuant to the provisions of this section if the employer fails to discharge his 
or her comparative share of the judgment 
(Added by Stats.1982, c 922, p. 3369, § 12.) 
Library References 
Workers' Compensation <*»938. 
CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 331 
ARTICLE 2. MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL TREATMENT 
Section 
4600. Provision by employer; liability for failure to provide; treatment by personal physician; 
medical examinations; operative date. 
4601. Request for change of physician or chiropractor by employee; consulting physician or 
chiropractor, expense of treatment 
4601.5. Repealed. 
4603. Change of physician or chiropractor by employer. 
4603.2. Notice of selection of physician; physician's reports; payment for services. 
4603.5. Format and content of notices; reasonable geographic areas; time limits for notices and 
responses; notification of employees' rights. 
4606. Public entities; self-insured employer under Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and 
Safety Act. 
4607. Attorney fees; successful defense by injured employee. 
4608. Pharmacy benefits; claim form reproductions [New]. 
Law Review Commentaries Workmen's compensation and vocational rehabilitation in 
Determination of post earnings potential. (1973) 61 California. Kelly W Bixby (1972) 9 San Diego L.Rev. 961 
C.L.R. 289. 
§ 4600. Provision by employer; liability for failure to provide; treatment by personal physician; 
medical examinations; operative date 
Medical, surgical, chiropractic, and hospital treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and 
surgical supplies, crutches, and apparatus, including artificial members, which is reasonably required 
to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury shall be provided by the employer. In the case of his 
Underline Indicates changes or additions by amendment 
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ADDENDUM 
III 
Holden v. N. L. Industries, Inc., No. C 79-0391 
slip op. (D. Utah 1982) 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
REBECCA HOLDEN, GREGORY 
HOLDEN, DENISE HOLDEN, and 
JEFFREY HOLDEN, by and 
through their Parent and Next 
Friend DEBRA HOLDEN and 
DEBRA HOLDEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
N L INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
<T> - i •'/> 5? 
3 D C • . 
MEMORANDUM DECISIONS ^ 
C i v i l No: C - 7 9 - 0 3 9 1 
r>0 - J ^ ~ 
^ O ~i r^ ; 
c-<. 
m 
Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, 
and Fifth Counts of plaintiffs' complaint was orally argued on 
December 28, 1979. Plaintiffs were represented by Ralph L. 
Dewsnup and defendant was represented by J. Dennis Frederick. 
Prior to the hearing, the court had read the memoranda of counsel. 
Following argument, the court granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss the Third, Fourth and Fifth Counts of plaintiffs' complaint 
and ruled that the order would be appealable. Thereafter, and 
following further argument and submissions from counsel, that 
order was withdrawn and the court agreed to certify the legal 
issues involved in this case to the Utah Supreme Court inasmuch 
as that court had never ruled on these issues. 
By its opinion of April 28", 1981 the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the Utah Constitution does not allow it to answer 
questions of law certified to it by federal courts. Accordingly, 
the request for certification was dismissed. The parties have 
now resubmitted defendant's motion to this court and the court 
has reread all of the memoranda and various of the authorities 
that have been cited to the court. Being now fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Counts of plaintiffs' complaint are dismissed and this order 
shall be appealable. Plaintiffs' attorney is to prepare an 
appropriate order in accordance herewith. 
In this case the plaintiffs are the widow and surviving 
children of Glenn Holden who was killed in an explosion that 
occurred on July 11, 1977 and while working in defendant's 
magnesium plant in Rowley, Utah. There is no question but that 
the decedent was working and was within the scope of his 
employment with the defendant at the time he was killed. 
Plaintiffs in their complaint have claimed a right to recover 
damages from the defendant for the alleged wrongful death of 
Mr. Holden. Count One has alleged general intentional misconduct 
and the following four counts, which are m question here, 
allege fraud, negligent installation, strict product liability 
and product negligence. By the Second through Fifth Counts of 
their complaint plaintiffs rely upon theories which are claimed 
to pierce the exclusive remedy provisions of Utah's Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The defendant claims that those exclusive 
remedy provisions cannot be pierced and that they provide complete 
protection from liability of the claims alleged against it by 
plaintiffs m Counts II through V of their complaint. 
There are no Utah cases that deal with the legal issues 
before this court. There are a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions and these are cited in the parties' memoranda and 
will not be cited herein. There are two questions to be decided 
by this court and the court's answers to these questions are as 
follows: 
1. The court holds that the exclusive remedy provision 
of Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, § 35-1-60, U.C.A. 1953, 
bars plaintiffs' claims against the defendant employer and where 
plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant employer committed the 
intentional tort of fraud upon plaintiffs' decedent which caused 
his death. 
2. The court further holds that the exclusive remedy 
provision of that same act bars plaintiffs' claims against 
defendant employer arising out of negligent installation of 
the equipment which injured plaintiffs' decedent and out of 
product liability where plaintiffs have alleged that the cause 
of action against the defendant arose out of actions, conduct 
and relationships which were independent of defendant's status 
as an employer. In other words, this court has determined that 
the so-called "dual capacity doctrine" would not be recognized 
or adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated this /X^day of March, 1982. 
•A 
' ha<.rk:h LJ'<:/i 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judge 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to the 
following named counsel this /% day of March, 1982. 
Mr. W. Eugene Hansen, Esq. 
Mr« Ralph L. Dewsnup, Esq. 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. J. Dennis Frederick, Esq. 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary 
